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NOTE .AND COMMENT 
S~GUARDING 'l'~ CRn.IINAJ, Dtn:NDAN'l'.-Every now and then a new 
attack is made somewhere in the United States upon the rule prohibiting 
comment before the jury upon the fact that the defendant in a criminal 
case has not testified as a witness in his own behalf. At the present time 
an effort of this kind is being made in the Michigan legislature, and the 
introduction of the bill drew quite a little storm of protest from the State 
press as a dangerous inroad upon our ancient guarantees of personal liberty 
and security. In fact, however, it directly touches nothing more ancient 
than a statutory privilege which dates from the year 1861. By the Public 
Acts of that year the disability of parties to actions to testify as witnesses 
in this State was removed, but it was expressly provided that defendants in 
criminal cases could not be compelled to testify, but might do so or not 
at their own pleasure. (Act No. 125, §2). In 1881 an amendment to this 
statute was passed providing, as to the defendant in a criminal case, that 
"his neglect to testify shall not create any presumption against him, nor 
sliall the court permit any reference or comment to be made to or upon such 
neglect." (Pub. Acts, 1881, No. 245). And this is the form it retains in 
the Judicature Act. (Ch. 17, ·§64). 
Conceiving this statute to be merely a legislative interpretation of the 
constitutional provision that "No person shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself' ·(Const. 1850, Art. VI, §32; Const. 
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1909, Art. II, §16), the legislature is considering the proposal of a constitu-
tional amendment to permit such comment. ,And this is probably necessary, 
for judicial opinion seems to incline toward the view that comment upon a 
failure .to testify is a violation of this provision against compulsory self-
' incrimination. CooLi>Y, CoNST. LIM~ (7th Ed.) 447; People v. Tyler, 36 Cal. 
522; State v. Cameron, 40 Vt. 555; Commonwealth v. Harlow, no Mass. 4II; 
Commonwealth v. Scott, 123 Mass. 239. Only in Maine, it appears, has such 
comment been expressly held to be compatible with this constitutional priv-
ilege. .State v. Bartlett, 55 Me. 200, 217; State v. Banks, 78 Me. 490. The 
New Jersey cases are not germane because in that State the constitution does 
not have a similar provision. Parker v. State, 61 N. J~ L. 3o8. 
The wisdom of the rule prohibiting comment upon a defendant's failure 
to testify is a matter which may well be questioned. In the first place, 
there is an artificiality and lack of candor in the ostrich-like refusal to 
admit the existence of a perfectly obvious fact. As the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey says, the inference which follows from a failure to testify "is 
natural and irresistible. It will be drawn by honest jurymen, and no in"' 
structions will prevent it. Must a court refrain from noticing that which 
is so plain and forciible an indication of guilt?" Parker v. State, supra. 
But a more serious objection is that the rule destroys a perfectly reliable 
and legitimate means for aiding the jury to reach a just verdict. Fleehig 
from arrest, giving contradictory or· improbable accounts of the matters in 
issue, refusing to account for the possession of stolen property,-all these 
are acts which suggest inferences as to guilt which are conceded to be 
proper for the jury to consider. Conduct at the trial in refusing to give 
testimony which could ordinarily be damaging only if the defendant were 
· guilty, is an act equally suggestive of inference. If the co.nduct of the 
defendant before the trial is available, why should his conduct at the trial 
be deemed too dangerous and unjustly prejudicial for the jury to consider? 
The rule evinces an astounding lack of confidence in the jury. 
· This much is clear, that the rule hei;-e considered has nothing to do with 
. due process of law, and is not guaranteed to the citizens of the several States 
by the. United l'tates Constitution. It is at most a mere special application 
of a more general rule, namely, against self-incrimination, and even this 
latter rule is merely one of expediency and "has no place in the jurisprudence 
of civilized and free countries outside the domain of the common law, and 
it is nowhere observed among our own. people in the search for truth out-
~ide the administration of the law." Twining v. New Jersey, 2n U. S. 78, 
n3. And it is also clear that in England and her colonies, where the 
gull!'antees of ilie common law are helc\}n as high regard as with us, no 
such rule as that prohibiting comment on failure to testify is recognized. 
Regina v. Rhodes [1899] 1 Q. B. 7i; Kops v. Regina [1894] App. Cas. New 
South Wales, 650, affirming Id., 14 N. S. Wales L. Rep. 150. 
It is also interesting to note that the large and iilfluential Law Reform 
Coµimittee of the ,New York Bar Association, in a report made in De-
cen;tl>er, .I9~4. unanhnously, recommep.ded the enactment of legislation similar 
fo that now proposed in the Michigan legislature. 
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A corollary to the rule against comment is involved in the recent and 
much discussed case of Caminetti, et al. v. United States, 37 Sup. Ct. 192, 
decided Jan. 15, 1917. In that case the defendant took the stand and testified 
as to events up to a certain point, but he stopped short there and refused 
to testify further. This failure to testify to subsequent events was put 
before the jury by an instruction from the court as evidence for their 
consideration. It was contended on behalf of the defendant that this was 
error, under the federal statute (Act of March 16, 1878, 20 Stat. 30, c. 37} 
which had been held to prohibit comment on·a failure to testify. Wilson v. 
United States, 149 U. S. 6o. The Supreme Court of the United States held, 
affirming th~ Circuit Court of Appeals below, that when the defendant took 
the stand he voluntarily relinquished his privilege of silence together With 
the immunity from comment thereon, and could not stop his testimony at 
any point he saw fit "without subjecting his silence to the inferences to be 
naturally drawn from it." The same point had previously been decided 
the other way by two United States Circuit Courts of Appeals. Balliet v. 
United States, 129 Fed. 689, 64 C. C. A. 201; Myrick v. United States, 219 
Fed. I, 134 C. C. A. 619. The decision in the Diggs case is in harmony 
with the generally accepted view. W1GM0Rt, Evm., §2273(4), and note. 
E. R. S. 
TH!t ScoPt o:r' THt MANN Ac:t.-As was to be expected in view of the 
well-settled doctrine of the Supreme Court that the constitutional grant 
of power to regulate interstat~ commerce includes power of control over 
transportation of persons as well as property, it was held in Hoke v. United 
States,· 227 U. S. 3o8, 57 L. Ed. 523, 33 Sup. Ct. 281, that the WHITt 
SI.Avt TRAFF'IC Ar!r of 1910 (36 Stat. 825), usually referred to as the MANN 
Ac:t, was constitutional. State legislation covering the same ground, it 
has been held, has :been displaced. State v. Harper, 48 Mont.456, 138 Pac. 495. 
Wide differences as to the interpretation of the Ac:r early arose. That 
commercialized vice was intended to be reached was indicated by the name 
given to the ACT by Congress itself and by the report accompanying the 
introduction of the Ac:r into the House of Representatives. This view seems 
to have been adopted by Judge PoLU>CK in the United States District Court 
in an unreported case. See 12 MICH. L. Rtv. 156. The terms of the ACT, 
however, quite clearly do not so limit its operation. By §2 it is provided 
"That any person who shall knowipgly transport or cause to be transported 
* * * in interstate or foreign commerce * * * any woman or girl for the 
purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose 
* * * shall be ·deemed guilty of a felony," etc. In three cases attracting 
wide attention it was held that the offense was committed by transportation 
of a woman in interstate commerce simply for the gratification of personal 
desire and pleasure, no phase of commercialized vice being present. Johnson 
v. United States, 215 Fed. 679, 131 C. C. A. 613; Diggs v. United States, 
and Camilletti v. United States, 220 Fed. 545· The latter cases have been 
recently affirmed by the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice and Justices 
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:McKlwNA and ~.however, dissenting. Caminetti, et al. v. United States, 
37 Sup. Ct. zgz 
Speaking of the interpretation of written law BI.ACKS'lON:t says, "As to 
the efjects and consequence, the rule is, that where words bear either none, 
or a very absurd signification, if literally understood, we must a little 
deviate from the received sense of them. Therefore the Bolognian law, 
mentioned by PUI!.FtNDORJt, which enacted 'that whoever drew blood in the 
streets .should be punished with the utmost severity,' was held after long 
debate not to extend to the surgeon, who opened the vein of a person that 
fell down in the street with a fit." I Br.AcK. CoMM. *6o. "The same com-
mon sense accepts the ruling, cited by Pr.oWDSN, that the statute of First 
Edward II, which enacts that a prisoner who breaks prison shall be guilty 
of felony, does not extend to a prisoner who breaks out when the prison 
is on fire; 'for he is not to be hanged because he would not stay to be burnt.' 
And we think that a like common sense will sanction the ruling we make, 
that the Act of Congress which punishes the obstruction or retarding of the 
passage of the mail, or of its carrier, does not apply to a case of temporary 
detention of the mail caused by the arrest of the carrier upon an indictment 
for murder." United States v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 482, 486. And in Church of 
The Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U. S. 457, it was held that the im-
portation by the accused of an ali~ under contract to serve as rector of 
a church was not punishable under a; statute making it an offense to import 
aliens "under contract or agreement to perform labor in the United States," 
it being conceded that the act upon which the prosecution was based was 
dearly included within the language of the statute. The dissenting Justices 
in the principal case, being of opinion both from external and internal evi-
dences that the legislative purpose was to cover only commercialized vice, 
sought to apply the principle of these holdings. The complete blameless-
ness of the· physician, of the officer making the arrest of the mail carrier, 
and of the church, in the instances referred to wonld seem to make out 
a situation differi~g 'vitally from that of the defendant who has transported 
a woman in interstate commerce for the purpose of fornication or adultery. 
To the argument that under the interpretation of the Ac:!r adopted by the 
Supreme Court opportunities for blackmail may be vastly increased, it may 
perhaps be suggested that even so the wholly innocent traveller has nothing 
to fear. If a man in his peregrinations chooses to provide himself with 
· feinale society to while away the tedious hours of travel it is not- entirely 
unreasonable to expect him to assume such risks, even granting that re-
lations between him and his companion may never actually have passed 
beyond the purely platonic. R. W. A. 
Tn LIABIUTY oF -r11:e INI'rIAI. CAiuu£R AF'rr:R 'rHS FIN.AI. CABRIER Bsco:Mss 
A WABSHOUS:tMAN.-In England and a few of the United States the rule of 
Muschamp v. Lancaster, etc., Ry. Co., 8 Mees. & W. 421, is followed, and 
a carrier which receives goods for transportation to a point beyond its 
terminus presumably assumes liability for through transportation. In most 
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of the States a carrier may assume liability beyond its own line by making 
a "through contract," but unless it does so the carrier receiving goods 
destined for a point not ·on its line is liable only for safe carriage over its 
own part of the route and for delivery to the succeeding carrier. As ·re-
gards interstate transportation, Congress doubtless assumed complete control 
over the matter by the CARMACK AMENDMENT of 1go6 (34 Stat. at L 584, 
Ch. 3591) and provided therein that the initial carrier should be liable for 
"any loss, damage or injury to such property caused by it" or any connecting 
carrier. One of the results of the act referred to, as construed by the 
United States Supreme Court in Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 
U. S. 491, and other cases, was to make ·contracts limiting the carrier's 
liability valid, regardless of State rules to the contrary; and the courts of 
States whose laws had been more advantageous to the shipper were loath 
to extend its operation any further than they were obliged to by the decisions 
of the United States Supreme Court. See IS MlcH L. Rr:v. 314 In like 
manner, the courts of States whose laws were more advantageous to the 
initial carrier have been reluctant to extend the effect of the provision 
rendering such carrier liable for acts of the connecting carrier further than 
the words of the act and the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United 
States have necessitated. The decisions of many of the State courts show 
a marked tendency to exclude from the operation of the CARMACK A:MEND-
MJ;NT all matters not expressly· provided for in it; while the federal courts, 
on the other hand, have been inclined to make the amendment as a whole 
all-inclusive, and to extend its application broadly and freely. For example, 
some State courts, even after ·the Croninger case, held that limitations of 
of liability for delay were not within the scope of the CARMACK AMENDMENT 
and were governed by State rules, and, similarly, that the initial carrier was 
not by that amendment made liable for delay caused by a connecting carrier. 
Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Nelson, (Tex. Civ. App. 19II), 139 S. W. 81. But 
the United States Supreme Court decided that delay in interstate transportation 
was covered 1by the amendment. N. Y. & Norfolk R.R. v.PeninsulaExchange, 
240 U. S. 34. 36 Sup. Ct. 230. So, as some of the State courts sought to 
restrict the effect of the amendment by holding that a contract limiting the 
carrier's liability became amenable to State rules when the final carrier 
ceased to act as carrier and became a warehouseman, it has been held that 
the liability imposed by the amendment upon the initial carrier is termin-
ated as soon as the carrier relation ceases. In Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. 
Stuart's Draft Co., 109 Va. 184, the Virginia court declared that "the 
vicarious liability sought to be fastened upon the defendant [the initial car-
rier] is for the acts of the connecting carrier as carrier and not as ware-
houseman." And other courts have referred to this case with approval. 
Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Brewer, 183 Ala. 172, 62 So. 698; Hogan Milling 
Co. v. Union Pacific R. Co., 91 Kans. 783. And in a very recent case the 
New York Supreme Court, citing the Stuart's Draft case and others, based 
its decision in part upon the proposition that "the initial carrier is not liable 
for any breach of duty on the part of the final carrier as warehouseman.'' 
Dodge & Dent Mfg. Co. v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 162 N. Y. Supp. 549. 
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In the first cases that came before it involving the CARMACK AMtm>MF:NT, 
the United States Supreme Court said that the provision of that amendment 
making the initial carrier liable for defaults of connecting carriers operated 
to make such connecting carriers the agents of the initial carrier, and inti-
mated that its effect was to apply to all interstate shipments over several lines 
the English rule as to through contracts. In Atlantic Coast Line v. River-
side Mills, 219 U. S. 186, the court said: "In substance Congress has said 
tQ such carriers: 'If you receive articles for transportation from a point 
in one State to a ·place in ".another, you must .do so under a contract to 
transport to the place .designated'." And in Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. 
v. Wallace, 223 U.S. 481, it was said that "under the CARMACK AMF:NDMF:NT, 
wherever the carrier voluntarily accepts goods for shipment to a point on 
another line in another. State, ·it is conclusively treated as having made 
a through contract." And the same conclusion was reached by the Alabama 
court in Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Brewer, supra, in which the court, re-
ferring to the C~MACK AMF:NDMF:NT and the English rule, said that "the 
true· effect of said am.endment is to bring all interstate shipments, the stip-
ulations of bills of lading to the contrary notwithstanding, under the opera-
tion of the rule." . Had the effect of the amendment been no more than to 
bring ·ai1 interstate transportation 1ltlder the operation of the English rule 
as to through contracts, it might well have been decided that the initial car-
rier was abs.olved from all further liability as soon as the final carrier ceased 
to be a carrier with reference to a particular shipment. It had been held 
in Illinois, which is one of the states where the English rule prevails, that 
even under that rule the initial carrier was not liable for a mis-delivery by 
the· connecting carrier after the latter had ceased to be a carrier and had 
become a warehouseman. Illinois Central R. Ca. v. Carter, 165 Ill. 570, 46 
N. E. 374 36 L. R A. 527. The lia:bility in England was apparently not so 
restricted. Crouch v. Great Western Ry Co., 6 W. R 391. But Congress 
went further, and defined "transportation" to include "all services in ·con-
nection with the receipt, delivery, elevation and transfer in transit, ven-
tilation, refrigeration or icing, storage and handling of the property trans-
ported;" and it seems, from this definition and the broad language of the 
act, that Congress intended by the CARMACK AMF:NDMF:NT to make the initial 
carrier liable for any loss, damage, or injury until the interstate shipment 
is completed, and that goods shipped are still in interstate commerce, even 
though the final carrier has become a warehouseman. So it was held, with 
reference to the termination of contracts limiting liability, by the Supreme 
Court of the United States. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L...Ry. Co. v. Dettlebach, 
239 U. S. 588; Southern R. Co. v .. Prescott, 240 U. S. 632; Western Transit 
Co. v. Leslie Co . . (1917) 37 Sup. Ct. 133. And the Kentucky court, in Nash-
ville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Dreyfuss-Weil Co., 150 Ky. 333, 150 S. W. 321, 
reached the same conclusion with regard to the termination of the liability 
of the initial carrier. It would seem that if the provisions of the original 
contract are still in force as against the shipper after the c;arrier relation has 
ended, they ought also to continue to be binding on the initial carrier. 
NOTE AND COMMENT 429 
It must be concluded, therefore, that the proposition advanced in Dodge 
& Dent Mfg. Co. v. Pemi.sylvania R. R. Co., supra, viz. that the responsi-
bility of the initial carrier is at an end when the final carrier becomes a 
warehouseman, cannot be supported as to interstate shipments. And this 
conclusion is strengthened by an examination of the authorities cited in 
support of it. In Wien v. New York Central & H. R.R. Co., 166 App. Div. 
766, the New York court held that the initial carrier was not liable for loss 
incurred by the shipper as the result of the connecting carrier's mistake and 
failure to return the shipment promptly after the consignee had refused to 
accept the goods and the consignor had ordered their return. The decision 
was put on the ground that the later negotiations between the consignor and 
the final carrier amounted to a new contract, and that the CARMACK AMSND-
MSN'l' entitled the shipper to recover from the initial carrier for defaults only 
in the performance of the original contract, regarded as a through contract. 
Whether or not this decision was correct, it is not authority for the proposi-
tion advanced in the principal case, since the question there involved is not 
whether the initial carrier is liable for a default by the connecting carrier 
in the performance of a new contract made by it, but whether the original 
contract was still subsisting. Nor is the decision in the Stuart's Draft case, 
supra, and the other cases mentioned above as approving it, authority for 
the broad doctrine that the initial carrier is relieved of all further responsi-
bility as soon as the final carrier becomes a warehouseman. However posi-
tive the dicta in those cases may be, the decisions themselves involved the 
question, not whether the initial carrier was liable at all after the final carrier 
had ceased to act as such, but whether it was liable thereafter as a carrier; 
in other words, what those cases decided was that the CARMACK AMSNDMSN'l' 
did not impose carrier liability on the initial carrier ,for a loss or injury to 
goods occurring while they were held by the succeeding carrier as a ware-
houseman. It has often been held that under that amendment the initial 
carrier may make any defense which might be made by the connecting car-
rier in whose hands the injury occurred. Riverside Mills v. Atlantic Coast 
Dine, 168 Fed. g87; Brinson & Kramer v. Norfolk Southern R. Co., l(ig 
N. C. 425, 86 S. E. 371; Burke v. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co., 147 N. Y. Supp. 794-
The natural corollary of that proposition is that where the liability of the 
connecting carrier is that of a warehouseman, the liability of the initial car-
rier is also that of a warehouseman; and it seems obvious that a decision 
that the initial carrier is not held to the strict accountability of a carrier 
after its agent, the final carrier, has become a warehouseman, is by no means 
equivalent to a holding that its re5ponsibility has entirely ceased. 
The correct rule, both on principle and authority, seems to be that under 
the CARMACK AMSNDMSN'l' the delivering carrier is the agent of the initial 
carrier in all matters relating to the delivery of the goods and their pres-
ervation or disposition after arrival at destination (Burkenroacl Goldsmith 
Co. v. Ill. Cent. R. Co., 138 La. 81, 70 So. 44) ; that so long as the relation of 
carrier and shipper subsists, whether on its own or connecting lines, the lia-
bility of the initial carrier is a carrier liability; and that when the final car-
rier becomes a warehouseman the responsibility of the initial carrier 
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does not cease, but that its liability thereafter is that of a warehouse-
man only. And these observations apply as well to interstate shipments 
made after the Cu?.UIINs A'?o!tNDMtNT of 1915 (38 Stat. at L. ng6) as be-
fore, since the provision of the CARMACK AYtNDMtNT applicable to this situ-
ation is retained verbatim in the later act. W. H. S. 
lMPAmMtNT OJ! THE 0BuGATION oF CoNTRACT.-The United States Supreme 
Court has again indicated its astuteness to hold a decision of a State court 
to be a "law impairing the obligation of contracts,'' wherever it can find that 
the decision was in fact reached by giving effect to some st,tbsequent legisla-
tion. Each of two street railway companies in Detroit was granted the 
privilege of occupying additional streets, by ordinances which contained stip-
ulations binding each company to accept a single fare for transportation 
"over any of its lines in said city'' and also to sell tickets at a certain re-
duced ·rate. The plaintiff in error, the Detroit United Railway, acquired and 
united under one organization the two street IJilway corporations referred 
to above and also certain suburban lines operating under village and town-
ship grants, contractual in their nature, but which franchises did not require 
that these suburban lines sell tickets at the same rate as was required by the 
city of Detroit from those street railways mentioned above, now a part of 
the Detroit United Railway system. · Afterwards, by an act of the legisla-
ture, the territory in which these suburban lines were operating was annexed 
to the City of Detroit, the act providing that the annexed territory should be 
subject to all the ordinances and regulations of the city, with exceptions not 
now material. It was the contention of the State and of the City of Detroit that 
the provisions in .the ordinances, which contained stipulations regarding fares, 
and which were assented to by the predecessors of the Detroit United Rail-
way, were intended to be applica:ble throughout the city as it might from time 
to time be enlarged, and that the Detroit United Railway, as successor to 
these companies, is bound by the limitations of those ordinances as to all 
its lines within the city, not only as its limits existed at the time of .Passage 
of the ordinances, but also as to the lines it owns in the territory which was 
subsequently annexed to the city. The Supreme Court held that the giving of 
such effect to the annexation act would amount to an impairment of the 
obligation of contract. Detroit United Railway v. People of the State of 
Michigan, and Detroit United Railway v. City of Detroit, 37 Sup. Ct. 87. 
This decision reversed the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan, as 
that tribunal had determined the iss~es favorably to the city and State. 
People v. Detroit United Railway, 162 Mich. 46o, 139 Am. St. Rep. 582, 125 
N. W. 700, 127 N. W. 748; Detroit United Railway v. City of Detroit, 173 
Mich. 314 139 N. W. 56. 
A consideration of these two Michigan cases discloses that the decisions 
were founded upon a construction of the ordinances requiring the predeces-
sors of the Detroit United Railway to charge a single fare for transportation 
between any two points on their lines within the city limits. The Mlthigan 
court considered that in entering into this contract the parties had home in 
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mind the power of the State to increase or diminish the territory of a city 
and that the words "city limits" were used with reference to what the 
boundaries of the city might be in the future. This construction is upheld 
by St. Louis Gaslight Co. v. City of St. Louis, 46 Mo. 12I; Town of Toiedo 
v. Edens, 59 Iowa 352, 13 N. W. 313; McQun.r.IN, MuN. ORDINANCJ;s, §218. 
The decision in the two Michigan cases is in harmony with Indiana R. Co. v. 
Hoffman, 161 Ind. 593, 6g N. E. 399, and Peterson v. Power Co., 6o Wash. 
4o6, III Pac. 338, 140 Am. St. Rep. 936, the facts and questions involved in 
these decisions being very similar to the two principal cases. 
The contract clause of the Federal constitution is not directed against all 
impairment of contract obligation. It does not reach mere errors committed 
by a State court when passing upon the validity or effect of a contract under 
the laws in existence when it was made. And so, while such errors may 
operate to impair the obligation Qf the contract, they do not give rise to a 
Federal question. Cross Lake Club v. Louisiana, 224 U. S. 632, 639, 56 L. Ed. 
924 32 Sup. Ct. 577, and cases there cited. And on this point the jurisdiction 
of the Federal Supreme Court was questioned by respondents in error. How-
ever, the court did not consider that the decisions of the State courts turned 
upon the mere meaning of the contracts founded upon an acceptance of the 
terms of the ordinances; but that the decisions were reached only through 
a consideration of the combined effect of those ordinances and the acts of 
the legislature of Michigan, which thereafter extended the city limits. And 
when the State court, "either expressly or by necessary limitation, gives 
effect to a subsequent law of the State whereby the obligation of the con-
tract is alleged to be impaired," a Federal question is presented. In such a 
case it becomes our duty to take jurisdiction and to determine the existence 
and validity of the contract, what obligations arose from it, and whether 
they are impaired by the subsequent law." Cross Lake Club. v. Louisiana, 
supra. It has also been lield in Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, I Wall. 175, 
17 L. Ed. 520, and in many cases which have followed the doctrine set forth 
in that case, that if the contract when made was valid by the laws of the 
State as then expounded and administered in its courts of justice, its validity 
and obligation cannot be impaired by any subsequent decision of its court. 
See WII.I.OUGHBY, CONST., 922. 
The pivotal question therefore would seem to be whether or not the 
Michigan court's decision, in determining the obligation of the contract, did 
give effect to the subsequent act of the legislature. It is apparent that in 
determining whether or not the State court has given effect to any subsequent 
legislation so as to impair the obligation of the contract, the Federal court 
is not bound by the wording of the opinion of the State court, but may 
determine for itself whether or not effect was in fact given to subsequent 
legislation. "Otherwise, although it was the aim of the suit and effect of 
the judgment to give vitality and operation to the subsequent law, and this 
court might be of the opinion that there was a valid contract which thereby 
would be impaired, it would be powerless to enforce the constitutional guar-
antee." Louisiana Ry. & Nav. Co. v. Behrman, 235 U.S. 164, 170. 59 L. Ed. 
175, 18o, 35 Sup. Ct. 6z, and cases there cited. . 
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The court thereupon went into a consideration of the cases on the merits, 
and being unable to accept the construction adopted by the Michigan court 
of the ordinances referred to a:bove, it was of the opinion that the decisions 
reached by the State court could have been reached only by giving effect to 
the subsequent acts of the State legislature which made the annexed 
territory subject to the ordinances of the city, and thereby impaired the 
obligation of the contracts between the suburban lines and the villages and 
townships which granted the franchises. Justice CI.ARKS rendered a dis-
senting opinion in which Justice BRANDJUS concurred. These justices con-
sidered that "the passing of the valid extension act merely created a situ-
ation under which the implied condition e:dsting in the fare contract from 
beginning, finds an application in the new territory. This is giving effect 
not to the terms of the .act of the legislature, but to the terms of the con-
tract with the city, and the most that can be said against the decision of the 
Supreme Court of Michigan is that it gives an erroneous construction of 
the contract." But this does not give rise to a Federal question within the 
rule of Cross Lake Club v. Louisiana, supra. W. L. 0. 
TH:e RIGH'l' 'l'O !U;SCIND S'J.'OCK-D1vm:eNDS ~DY D:ecr.AMIJ.-The rule 
that cash dividends, once declared and published, become debts, irrevocable 
and absolutely due the shareholder, iS so well-established as to hardly merit 
discussion. 7 CooK, CoRPORATIONS, §s41; s TAYLOR, CoRPORA'l'IONs, §568; 
MACHSN, MoD:ERN LAW OF CoRPORA'l'IONS, §1358; MoRAw:eTz, CoRPORA'l'IONS, 
§445; CLARK & MARsHAI.L, PruvA'l'S CoRPORA'l'IoNs, §s17d. But in the recent 
case of Staats v. Biograph Co., 236 Fed. 454 (C. C. A. 1916), the same ques-
tion is raised as to stock dividends. 
The corporation was capitalized for $2,000,000 with all but $1,000 of this 
stock outstanding, and for over a year there had been a surplus each month 
of over $1,000,000 though there was a regular annual dividend of 12%: At 
this stage the directors declared and published a scrip dividend of 50% of 
the outstanding capital to be paid for in stock or cash at the optio~ of the 
directors. Before any scrip was actually issued the European war broke out 
and the directors, having well-grounded apprehensions as to the effect of the 
war on their business, voted to rescind the dividend. The plaintiff was a 
shareholder and sought to collect the dividend on his shares in the present 
action. The court affirmed the right of the directors to rescind the dividend 
and denied the plaintiff any recovery. 
The court recognized the prevailing doctrine as to cash dividends, but ex-
cepted stock dividends from the rule. The only authorities cited to support 
the distinction were Terry v. Eagle Lo.ck Co., 47 Conn. 141, a dictum in Dock 
v. Schlichter Jute Cordage Co., 167 Pa. 370, and MACHSN, MoD:ERN LAW OF 
CoRPORA'l'IONs, §6o1. As the Cordage Company case is not in point and 
MACHSN cites Terry v. Eagle Lock Co. as his sole authority, we may con-
sider that case alone. Doing so we find that the decision was based squarely 
on the laches of the plaintiff. Inasmuch as the case seems to be the only 
one in which the subject of the present discu"ssion has been raised prior to 
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the instant case we will disregard that matter and consider the dicta which 
form the exclusive basis for the decision in Staats v. Biograph Co. After 
first recognizing the general rule as to cash dividends ·C~N'.l'r:R, J. pro-
ceeds to distinguish stock dividends from cash dividends in this relation' on 
two grounds: first, the formalities intervening between the declaration of the 
dividend and the actual issue of the stock (stating that the whole matter 
is in fieri until the stock is actually issued) ; and, secondly, "such dividends 
do not materially affect the value of the stock. * * * It does not add to his 
(the shareholder's) ready cash, but it changes the form of his investment 
by increasing the number of his shares, thereby diminishing the value of each 
share, leaving the aggregate value of his stock the same. It is of no spe-
cial importance whether the value be divided into few or many shares." The 
first point is not much dwelt on as it is too readily answered by pointing 
out that formalities also intervene before a ·cash dividend can become cash 
after it is merely declared, and that saying that it is "in fieri" is begging the 
question. Moreover, in Terry v. Eagle Lock Co. it was necessary that the 
stock issue ·be authorized by vote of the shareholders, while in the instant 
case the directors had authority in themselves to issue stock under the 
circumstances. The second ground has been riddled in the cases dealing with 
the respective rights of life-tenant and remainderman to the dividends on 
stock devised to them. It is the fallacious basis of the so-called "Mas-
sachusetts Rule" which, though adopted by the United States Supreme Court 
in Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U. S. 549, has been repudiated in practically every 
state in the Union where the question has arisen, except Massachusetts, 
Illinois, Rhode Island, and: Georgia, the last-named being constrained by 
statute. 7 CooK, CoRPORA'l'IoNs, §555· Lord ELDON, in Paris v. Paris, 10 Ves. 
185, says : "As to the distinction between stock and money, that is too thin; 
and if the law is that this extraordinary profit (50% stock dividend), if 
given in the shape of stock shall be considered capital, it must !Je capital if 
given as money." The -logical framework of the doctrine quoted from 
Terry v. Eagle Lock Co. (which is sedulously followed by the court in the 
instant case) has been completely shattered by the masterly opinions of 
O'BRn:N, J., in McLouth v. Hunt, 154 N. Y. 179, and MARSHAI.L, J., in Soehn-
lein v. Soehnlein, 146 Wis. 330, as well as such typical cases as Earp's Ap-
peal, 28 Pa. St. 368; Ross' Appeal, 83 Pa. St. 264; Hite v. Hite, 93 Ky. 257; 
Thomas v. Gregg, 78 Md. 545; Pritchitt v. Nashville Trust Co., g6 Tenn. 
4721 and People v. Glynn, II4 N. Y. Supp. 46o. 
But in Soehnlein v. Soehnlein, sµpra, iMARSHAI.L, J. says: "Little or no 
benefit can be derived from an extensive discussion of mere case law. The 
better way is to discover the essential principle involved, if that can be done, 
and for a rule, trace that principle to a logical result." Refer to the argu-
ment quoted from Terry v. Eagle Lock Co. and relied on in the instant case 
as the sole basis for making a different rule for stock dividends than for 
cash dividends. Is the right to a stock-dividend: a mere "nominal right''? 
Why, then, the hundreds of expensive litigations ij:ietween life-tenants and 
remaindermen to secure such dividends? Why was the instant suit brought? 
Why do our eminent financiers consider it worth while to cut their juicy 
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"melons," often without any vestige of surplus, if they be such unsubstantial 
fruit? A mere "nominal right'' will hardly occasion such lavish expenditure 
of effort and treasure in this work-a-day world! Is it true that when the 
stock of a corporation having a capital of $r,ooo,ooo and a surplus of $r,ooo,-
ooo is increased to $2,000,000 and the additional $r,ooo,ooo in stock distributed 
pro rata among its shareholders, that the par value of its shares drops to 50 
or the market value from 200 to roo? We all know that is not true. The 
par value remains the same; the market value is controlled, as before, by 
earning power, value of control and the various currents of the market. The 
"nominal value" theory is pure mathematics; it has no place in the world 
of reality. 
A stock-dividend declared out of surplus is not a mere dilution of stock; 
it does not confer a mere nominal right upon the shareholder. It is true that 
the property of the corporation is not increased or diminished by such a 
dividend. But its liabilities are increased pro tanto, and this liability is to 
the existing shareholders. It is a debt to the shareholder to the full extent 
that the cash dividend is a debt. The vice in the "nominal value" theory is 
that its proponents have identified the corporation and its shareholders in a: 
relation where their rights and liabilities are separate, distinct and, to a certain 
degree, even inimical. 
The instant case was a hard one. for the corporation. The circumstances 
warranting the revocation of the dividend as a matter of business policy 
were so strong that the court was evidently impressed thereby. But these 
considerations of business policy would weigh even more heavily against 
the enforeement of a claim for a declared cash dividend. Indeed, the scrip 
was to be optional in form and the court allowed the choice of the stock-
dividend as the least threatening horn of the dilemma, under the rule of 
Robinson v. Robinson. We regret that the grounds for this decision were 
not more carefully considered. E. B. H. 
